Dollars for Differential

Posted on May 17, 2012

Caps winger Alexander Semin has been on short term deals the last few seasons. He signed a two-year contract extension on Oct. 27, 2007, a deal that paid him $4.2 million for the 2008-09 season and $5 million for 2009-10. The salary cap hit for each of those two seasons was $4.6 million. Semin inked a one-year extension on Dec. 26, 2009, a pact that paid him $6 million for the 2010-11 campaign. He then agreed to another one-year deal on Jan. 27, 2011 that paid him $6.7 million for the just-completed 2011-12 season. The 28-year-old winger is now set to become an unrestricted free agent for the first time in his career this July 1. Traditionally, the Caps don’t discuss contract negotiations nor do they say much (if anything) about their plans or level of interest for impending unrestricted free agents. But Semin’s agent Mark Gandler has already made a good deal of noise about his client not wanting to return to be a “role player” (Semin’s ice time has decreased in each of the last four seasons, from 19:14 in 2008-09 to 16:47 this past season). Given the past history of contract extensions, I believe if the Caps had interest in the right wing going forward they would have come to terms on a deal already. I’d be extremely surprised if Semin were a member of the 2012-13 Washington Capitals. Some have wondered how the Caps would replace the 21 goals Semin scored, which were about half of the 40 goals he scored in 2009-10. That’s a fair question, but the answer might be a little more complicated. Scoring goals is only half of the equation for success in the NHL. The other half is goals against. At this point, it’s worth taking a look at Washington’s recent past history on both sides of this equation. Season         GF (NHL rank)       GA (NHL rank)     Goal Differential 2005-06        230 (23)            300 (29)           -70 2006-07        234 (17)            275 (26)           -41 2007-08        238 (8)             227 (19)           +11 2008-09        268 (3)             240 (19)           +28 2009-10        313 (1)             227 (16)           +86 2010-11        219 (19)            191 (4)            +28 2011-12        218 (14)            226 (21)            +8 The Caps’ biggest goal differential improvements in the last seven seasons came in 2007-08 (plus-52) and in 2009-10 (plus-58). Their biggest dips were in each of the last two seasons (minus-58 in 2010-11 and minus-26 in 2011-12). Certainly, the change in the team’s style of play had an impact on its precipitous drop (30%) in goal-scoring from 2009-10 to 2010-11. That drop was tempered somewhat because of the team’s lowest goals against total in franchise history, a figure that was only 11 off the league lead. Looking just at last season, the team’s goals against total climbed by 35, easily the largest increase at any point in the last seven seasons. Washington went from allowing the fourth fewest goals in the league to being 21st in that department. Goals for went down by just one, and the team actually moved up the league’s ledger in that category in the process. Looking at just the last five seasons – the playoff seasons – the Caps have averaged 251 goals scored and 222 goals against. I would argue that the goals against column is the one where Washington should be looking to make improvements in 2012-13. In recent NHL seasons, lower goals against totals offer a better indicator of success than do high goals for totals. Of the four teams currently still alive in the 2012 Stanley Cup playoffs, three (Los Angeles, New York and Phoenix) finished in the NHL’s top five in goals against during the regular season. The Capitals were 21st in the league in that category in 2011-12. The 2011 Stanley Cup finalists were Vancouver and Boston, the teams that finished first and second, respectively, in goals against during the 2010-11 season. Semin has been a fixture among Washington’s top six forwards since the 2006-07 season. Someone would have to take his place in that role and would need to assume his ice time load. That replacement player could be promoted from within or brought in from the outside via a trade or a free agent signing. A great many of the 101 NHL players who scored 20 or more goals last season earned far less than $6.7 million. Whether or not that replacement player scored 21 goals or more wouldn’t matter as much as how the rest of the team performed. If a handful of players scored a handful more goals next season than they did this season, Semin’s production would be replaced, and his replacement’s production would be gravy. It is never about one guy. It’s about the team. Here’s an interesting example. The Philadelphia Flyers’ roster maneuvering from last summer is interesting to examine in the same fashion. The 2009-10 Flyers made a surprising run to the Cup final despite a very ordinary plus-10 goal differential (232-222) that season. In 2010-11, the Flyers were third in the NHL with 256 goals scored, just two tallies shy of the league lead. Philadelphia had seven 20-goal scorers on its roster at season’s end. The Flyers allowed 216 goals to finish 11th in the league. Their plus-40 goal differential was a significant improvement over the previous season. But management/ownership’s perception was that the team was perhaps too offense-heavy and too goaltending-light. Flyers’ general manager Paul Holmgren was reportedly given a mandate from ownership: stop the goaltending carousel. Holmgren acquired the negotiating rights to Phoenix netminder Ilya Bryzgalov and moved out top-six centers Mike Richards and Jeff Carter in separate deals with Los Angeles and Columbus, respectively. With all that salary cap space cleared out, Holmgren signed Bryzgalov to a nine-year contract. He changed the face of the entire team, and most figured that Philly would probably score fewer goals but would also allow fewer goals. Along with Richards (23 goals in 2010-11) and Carter (36), Ville Leino (19) and Nikolai Zherdev (16) weren’t back with the Flyers in 2011-12. How would Philadelphia replace all that lost goal-scoring? By committee. Scott Hartnell went from 24 to 37. Claude Giroux went from 25 to 28. Wayne Simmonds, obtained from the Kings in the Richards deal, scored 28, a dozen more than his previous high. Rookie Matt Read had 24, veteran Euro import Jaromir Jagr scored 19. Free agent signee Max Talbot had never scored more than 13 in the NHL, but he potted 19 for the ’11-12 Flyers. Jakub Voracek came from Columbus and scored 18; his previous high was 16. Rookies Sean Couturier (13) and Brayden Schenn (11) chipped in some offense, and it was more than enough to make up for the drops in the production of Danny Briere (16 goals down from 34 in 2010-11) and James van Riemsdyk (11 goals down from 21). When it was all said and done, the 2011-12 Flyers actually scored four more goals than they had the previous season, and they tied for second in the league. Success? Maybe not. Because the idea was to improve the defense/goaltending, and the Flyers allowed nine more goals (225) to go from 11th in the league to 20th in that category. The team’s goal differential in 2010-11 was a plus-40; it dropped to a plus-35 in 2011-12. The 2012-13 Capitals can't expect to get 48 goals from three rookie forwards, as the Flyers did. But not re-signing Semin should have far less of an impact than trading Richards and Carter did for the Flyers. Success in a salary cap environment is all about the wise allocation of dollars. Semin’s 2011-12 salary was seventh highest among all wingers in the NHL. He was nowhere near the top seven in the league in production among wingers, and his goal output has basically been halved over the last two seasons. The Caps will not need to spend anywhere near what the Flyers -- or most NHL te

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